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1 Introduction
Writing correct concurrent software is a diﬃcult task given the inherit non-
deterministic behaviour of such systems. Concurrent declarative languages
seem to be an interesting and practical choice for implementing concurrent
software due to the absence of side-eﬀects (or at least a reduced number of
them). For example, the concurrent functional language Erlang [5] is being
used by several companies worldwide to implement complex concurrent control
systems.
A technique which is often used to check that a concurrent program fulﬁlls
a set of desirable properties ismodel checking [9]. In model checking, in theory,
all the states of (a model of) a concurrent system are systematically explored to
check for safety requirements such as absence of deadlocks and similar critical
situations that can cause the system to misbehave. For instance, McErlang [7],
a model checker for programs written in Erlang, directly uses the actual Erlang
source code as the model to be analyzed. McErlang has been successfully
applied in a number of case studies, such as a Video–on–demand server [6],
leader election protocols [7], the control software for elevators, and multi-agent
systems playing for robotic soccer [4].
An example of a company using Erlang is LambdaStream S.L., which is
interested in improving their software quality as shown by their participation
in a European research project on property-based testing (ProTest 7 ). Thanks
to this project, a fruitful collaboration has been established between develop-
ers at LambdaStream and researchers at the University of A Corun˜a and the
Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid. One example of this collaboration is the
experience with veriﬁcation using McErlang of properties of several LambdaS-
tream components, since McErlang model checker is well suited to verify this
class of concurrent software components.
In this paper we describe the experience with checking several properties
on LambdaStream’s supervisor component using McErlang. A process super-
visor is responsible for starting, stopping, and monitoring its child processes.
Testing and reproducing errors in such code is intrinsically diﬃcult due to its
non-deterministic behaviour, asynchronous communication, timing, etc. At
the same time, it is crucial to establish the reliability of that critical software
component because it is integrated into several software systems at LambdaS-
tream. With the technique described in this paper, it was impossible to fully
verify the component. This limitation comes from the state explosion prob-
lem, which aﬀects all model checking techniques. Although the supervisor has
been in use in several products for some time and it was well tested by both
7 http://www.protest-project.eu/
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the developers and a speciﬁc testing team, and it was partially veriﬁed, a dis-
crepancy between the component speciﬁcation and the actual implementation
of the component was identiﬁed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A brief introduction to
Erlang and McErlang is provided in Section 2. The description of the process
supervisor component is given in Section 3 together with a brief description
of the properties we have considered. The implementation of such properties
and the experimental results of checking them with McErlang is explained in
Section 4. Finally, some conclusions and lines of future work are discussed in
Section 5.
2 Background
2.1 The Erlang Programming Language
Erlang [1,5] is a concurrent programming language and run-time system. The
sequential subset of the language is a dynamically typed functional program-
ming language with strict evaluation. Concurrency is achieved by lightweight
processes communicating through asynchronous message passing. Erlang has
no construct inducing side-eﬀects with the exception of communications among
processes 8 . Expressions are evaluated eagerly similarly to, for instance, Stan-
dard ML.
What makes Erlang diﬀerent from other functional languages is its support
for concurrency and distribution. With Erlang’s primitives for concurrency,
it resembles formal calculi such as Milner’s CCS [10] or Hoare’s CSP [8].
Because of the absence of side-eﬀects, limited to explicit inter-process com-
munications, concurrent programming is far simpler compared to standard
imperative languages. An Erlang virtual machine (node, in Erlang terminol-
ogy) hosts several Erlang processes running concurrently. Usually, an Erlang
node is mapped to an operating system process; an Erlang process is, in fact,
a lightweight user-level thread with very little creation and context-switching
overheads.
A distributed Erlang application consists of processes running in several
nodes, possibly at diﬀerent (physical or virtual) computers. Even though
the initialization and management of each node is platform dependent, the
nice feature is that communication among remote processes is equivalent in
a distributed framework, though remote communications are less eﬃcient, of
course.
8 Strictly speaking this is not true as Erlang has a process registry with side eﬀects, and
various libraries oﬀering mutable data structures. The use of such features in Erlang,
however, tends to be greatly reduced compared to other programming languages.
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Fault-tolerance in Erlang is achieved by linking processes together in order
to detect and possibly recover from abnormal process termination. Abnormal
termination occurs if, for example, a function tries to access the tail of an
empty list. Processes linked to the process that terminated abnormally are
notiﬁed of the termination, and can thus take corrective action, i.e., possibly
restarting the failed process. Process links are always bidirectional but the
treatment of process termination notiﬁcations may diﬀer between the two
parties.
Handling a large number of processes easily turns into an unmanageable
task, and therefore Erlang programmers mostly work with higher-level lan-
guage components provided by libraries. The OTP (Open Telecom Platform)
component library [12] is by far the most widely used library, oﬀering several
behaviours (design patterns in Erlang) that can be instantiated with con-
crete callback functions. For example, OTP behaviours include, among oth-
ers, generic servers (for client-server communication), ﬁnite state machines,
or a supervisor component for structuring fault-tolerant systems hierarchi-
cally, where a parent supervisor is responsible for supervising and managing
its children (work processes).
2.2 The McErlang model checker
McErlang [7] is a tool for model checking Erlang programs. The input to
McErlang is the Erlang program we want to verify together with the property
of interest. The fact that the program is the model facilitates the use in
real-world development.
As the model checking tool is itself implemented in Erlang we beneﬁt from
the advantages that a dynamically typed functional programming language of-
fers: easy prototyping and experimentation with new veriﬁcation algorithms,
rich executable models that use complex data structures directly programmed
in Erlang, the ability to deal with executable models interchangeably as pro-
grams (to be executed directly by the Erlang interpreter) and data, etc.
In order to use Erlang programs as models, McErlang undergoes a source-
to-source transformation to prepare the program for running under the model
checker. Then, the actual Erlang compiler translates the program to Erlang
byte code. Finally the program runs under the McErlang run-time system,
under the control of a veriﬁcation algorithm, using the regular Erlang byte-
code interpreter. The pure computation part of the code (i.e, code with no
side eﬀects) and memory management (including garbage collection), is carried
out by the normal Erlang run time system. However, the side eﬀect part is
executed under the McErlang run-time system, which is a complete rewrite
in Erlang of the basic process creating, scheduling, communication and fault-
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handling machinery of Erlang. Naturally, the new run-time system oﬀers easy
check pointing (capturing the state of all nodes and processes, of the message
mailboxes of all processes, and all messages in transit between processes) of
the whole program state as a feature.
The steps required to perform model checking with McErlang are the fol-
lowing:
(i) Create the model. Use the Erlang program directly. McErlang pro-
vides support for virtually the full language, full data type support, sup-
port for general process communication, node semantics (inter-process
communication behaves in a subtly diﬀerent way from intra-process com-
munication), fault detection and fault tolerance, and crucially can verify
programs written using the high-level OTP Erlang component library
used by most Erlang programs.
(ii) Formulate correctness properties. Write down the properties to ver-
ify as either a safety monitor or a formula in linear temporal logic (LTL).
A safety monitor is used to verify safety properties (something bad
never happens), by keeping an internal state to check the properties at
each state the program to verify reaches. Given a program and a monitor,
McErlang runs them in lockstep letting the monitor analyze each new
program state generated. If the property does not hold, a counterexample
(an execution trace) is generated. Monitors are capable of observing both
the shape of the system (e.g., which processes are alive) and signiﬁcant
system events (e.g., messages sent between processes).
Some properties cannot be expressed with safety monitors, for example,
liveness properties (something good eventually happens). In McErlang one
can express such properties in Lineal Temporal Logic (LTL), and use the
LTL2Buchi tool [11] to automatically translate an LTL formula into a
Bu¨chi automaton [3].
(iii) Generate scenarios. Model checking is typically a memory intensive
operation, and frequently completely verifying a large system may require
more computer memory than is available. As an alternative to verifying
the whole system at once we specify a sizeable number of smaller sys-
tem scenarios instead, specifying both system conﬁguration and process
communications, such that each scenario is small enough to admit com-
plete veriﬁcation. As an example, if the system to verify is a client/server
architecture, we verify a sizeable number of client–server conﬁgurations
varying the number of clients, and varying the requests that clients issue
to the servers.
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3 Case Study: Supervisor Process
3.1 The Notion of Supervision
A supervisor is a process in charge of starting, stopping and monitoring a
set of children (processes). Basically whenever a child process terminates the
supervisor should restart it, i.e., spawn a new process executing the task of the
terminated child. A supervisor typically supervises not only process workers,
but also other supervisors, deﬁning a hierarchical structure as shown in the
example of Fig. 1.
Supervisor1
Worker1 Supervisor2
Worker3 Supervisor3
Worker4 Worker5
Worker2
Fig. 1. A supervision tree.
There are several strategies of how a supervisor process should handle the
event of an abnormal termination of a child. The two main policies are:
• one for one: If a child process terminates, only that process is restarted.
• one for all: If a child process terminates, all other child processes are ter-
minated and then all children, including the originally terminated process,
are restarted.
There is usually a mechanism to prevent a situation where a process re-
peatedly terminates for the same reason, only to be immediately restarted
again. This mechanism involves a maximum restart intensity. When a child
reaches this restart intensity, the supervisor terminates all the child processes
and then itself.
As the supervision tree is hierarchical, when a lower-level supervisor termi-
nates, then the next higher level supervisor can take corrective action. That is,
either restarting the terminated supervisor (and its subsystem of processes),
or terminating itself if the error can not be handled on that level of the su-
pervision tree.
In addition to the restart policy, the creation and termination order of
children must be also speciﬁed in the supervisor.
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3.2 Supervisor Implementation
There is a standard implementation of the supervisor behaviour provided by
the open source distribution of Erlang/OTP. In this case study, we used an
implementation of a supervisor process slightly diﬀerent from the OTP imple-
mentation. This variant (from now on nos supervisor) was implemented by
the company LambdaStream because they wanted a more conﬁgurable super-
visor to easily integrate into its products. In particular, diﬀerent restarting
policies are allowed for each child node in nos supervisor.
Following the speciﬁcation for a child, a child process is spawned by a
supervisor process. In the nos supervisor a child speciﬁcation is a tuple:
{Id, StartFun, RestartFun, RestartStrategy, RestartIntensity, Shutdown, Options}
• Id is a name that is used to identify the child speciﬁcation internally by the
supervisor.
• StartFun deﬁnes the function call used to start the child.
• RestartFun deﬁnes the function call to restart the child.
• RestartStrategy. When a child process crashes/dies, if its restart strategy
is child, only this child will be restarted. If its restart strategy is all, all
the children will be stopped in reverse start order, and they will be restarted
(including the oﬀending one) in start order.
• RestartIntensity: either a tuple {MaxR,MaxT,Finally} or infinity:
· {MaxR,MaxT,Finally}. If a child is restarted MaxR times in MaxT or less
seconds, the Finally action is triggered:
Finally==kill sup. The supervisor shuts down its living children in
reverse start order, and then it terminates.
Finally==stop child. The oﬀending child is not restarted. Remaining
children continue restarting normally.
· infinity. If a child terminates, the supervisor will always try to restart
it.
• Shutdown. The shutdown strategy is the same as in the OTP supervisor.
· brutal kill. Supervisor kills processes, i.e., a child process P will be
unconditionally terminated by the supervisor sending an exit(P,kill)
message.
· infinity. The supervisor will inform the child process that it should
terminate and then wait to receive an exit signal from the child signaling
that it indeed has terminated.
· Timeout (integer). As in infinity but if no exit signal is received from
the child within the speciﬁed time, the child process is unconditionally
terminated.
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• Options is a list of options where an option can be either insistent restart
meaning that restart function failures are treated as process crashes instead
of restart errors, or {notify,pid()} which makes the supervisor send no-
tiﬁcation messages to the speciﬁed process identiﬁer.
3.3 Properties of the nos supervisor
By reading the nos supervisor documentation we came up with many inter-
esting properties to verify for its implementation. As a trivial example, we
wanted to check that a child that has terminated is actually restarted by its
supervisor. We also focused on properties regarding the diﬀerent restart inten-
sities and the shutdown strategies, checking all combinations of those options.
For example, we formulated and checked a property that states that if there is
any child speciﬁcation with the Finally action of the restart intensity set to
kill sup and this child reaches the maximum restart intensity, the supervisor
applies the Shutdown strategy to its children in reverse start order and then
it ﬁnishes. In the following section we describe how some of these properties
were veriﬁed using McErlang.
4 Veriﬁcation using McErlang
To verify the nos supervisor described in the previous section using McErlang
we follow the approach described in Sec. 2.2, i.e., we create a veriﬁable model,
we formulate a number of correctness properties, and then we generate a set
of scenarios.
4.1 Create the Model
Obtaining the model for this case-study is straightforward since McErlang
can use the actual source code as model. In this section, we explain the only
change to the source code of the nos supervisor that was needed to obtain a
veriﬁable model. To measure the restart intensity, the nos supervisor needs to
determine the number of restarts that took place within a certain time interval.
As McErlang currently implements neither real-time nor discrete-time model
checking algorithms we were forced to abstract away from the time interval.
add_restart (# child_spec{
restart_intensity = infinity
}) -> [];
add_restart (# child_spec{
restart_intensity = {MaxR , MaxT , Finally},
state = ChildState}) ->
Restarts = ChildState#child_state.restarts ,
Now = now(),
check_restarts( MaxR
D. Castro et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 271 (2011) 23–4030
, Finally
,filter_restarts(MaxT
,[Now|Restarts])).
As we can see above, the nos supervisor stores the restart time of each
process in a list, which is then ﬁltered using the diﬀerence between the time of
the current restart and the maximum time speciﬁed by the restart intensity.
If the resulting list is greater than the allowed number of restarts, then the
Finally action is triggered. If not, the ﬁltered list with the new restart time
is returned:
filter_restarts(MaxT , [H | Restarts]) ->
F = fun(Restart) ->
difference(Restart , H) < MaxT
end ,
[H | lists:takewhile(F, Restarts)].
check_restarts(MaxR , Finally , Restarts) ->
case length(Restarts) > MaxR of
true -> Finally;
false -> Restarts
end.
The solution was not to store concrete times when restarting, but merely
recording that a restart occurred (using the symbol now), until the length
of the list containing restart indications is equal to the maximum number of
restarts. The last two lines of add restart are thus replaced by the following
code fragment:
NewRestarts = case length(Restarts) >= MaxR of
true -> Restarts;
false -> [now | Restarts]
end ,
check_restarts(MaxR , Finally , NewRestarts ).
It no longer makes sense to ﬁlter the list, but instead the model checker
must consider two possibilities: whether these restarts happened within the
maximum time or not. McErlang oﬀers the possibility to express such a
non-deterministic choice using a function call to mce erl:choice giving the
branches as a list of anonymous functions as shown below, and during model
checking both alternatives will be explored:
check_restarts(MaxR , Finally , Restarts) ->
case length(Restarts) >= MaxR of
true ->
mce_erl:choice([ fun() -> Finally end
, fun () -> Restarts end
]);
false ->
Restarts
end.
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4.2 Formulating Correctness Properties
As explained in section 2.2, in McErlang correctness properties can be speciﬁed
either using a safety monitor, which run in parallel with the system to verify
and observe its actions, or as a formula of linear temporal logic. In practice,
most of the relevant nos supervisor correctness properties can be expressed as
safety monitors.
In McErlang a safety monitor is implemented as an Erlang behaviour; a
module implementing a safety monitor must implement the following callback
functions:
• an init function to initialize the monitor (which should return the initial
state of the monitor).
• a stateChange function: when the model checker computes a new system
state, this function is called with the following arguments: (i) the new
system state, (ii) the current state of the monitor, and (iii) the sequence
of system actions that occurred during the computation of the new system
state. The stateChange function should determine whether the new system
state, and the system actions, are acceptable given the current state of the
monitor. If so, the function should return a new monitor state, otherwise a
failure reason.
4.2.1 An Example Safety Monitor
In this section, a safety monitor which checks some properties for the nos supervisor
is shown. The relevant properties of interest are:
• a child is spawned only if it has died
• no process is killed by the nos supervisor without having a sibling process
that has terminated too many times (so that it should not be restarted
again).
To be able to determine whether a process spawning or a kill action caused
by the nos supervisor is allowed, the monitor has to keep track of the state of
all its children. Thus, the state of the monitor is a record keeping track of the
status of all child processes under supervision:
-record(monitorState ,
% List of dead or never started children
% ordered by the crash time
{ deadProcesses = []
% children killed by supervisor
, killedProcesses = []
% spawned children currently alive
, spawnedProcesses = []
% number of restarts for children
, supervisorChildren = []
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, supervisorPid = undefined
}).
The main function of the monitor is depicted below:
stateChange(_,MonState ,Actions) ->
...
case interpret_action(Action) of
{died , Pid , normal} ->
{ok ,Monstate};
{died , Pid , Reason} ->
died(Pid , Monstate );
{spawn , SpawnInfo , SpawnedPid} ->
case SpawnInfo of
{supervisor , Intensities}
-> setChildren(Intensities ,Monstate );
{worker , WorkerName}
-> spawned({WorkerName , SpawnedPid}
,Monstate)
end;
{killedby , SourcePid , KilledPid} ->
killed(KilledPid , Monstate );
_ ->
{ok ,Monstate}
end
...
where the function interpret action splits concrete program actions into
diﬀerent abstract categories, and for each one it checks whether that action is
acceptable in the current monitor state. The action {died, Pid, normal},
for instance, represents the fact that a process has terminated normally (and
so should not be restarted). If the abstract action represent a new child process
being spawned, the function spawned is called:
spawned({WorkerName , Pid}, State) ->
DeadProcs =
State#programState.deadProcesses ,
SpawnedProcs =
State#programState.spawnedProcesses ,
case lists:member(WorkerName , DeadProcs) of
true ->
State#programState
{deadProcesses = lists:delete(WorkerName
,DeadProcs),
spawnedProcesses = [{WorkerName ,Pid}
| SpawnedProcs]};
false ->
throw("Alreadyspawnedworker")
end.
The spawned functions checks that the (name of the) newly spawned child
function is not already spawned, and removes the new child from the list of
dead processes and then adds it to the list of spawned ones. If the child is
already spawned, an exception is thrown which notiﬁes McErlang that the
monitor has found an error.
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Similarly, when a child dies abnormally the died function is called, which
increments the restart counter for the child. This counter is checked when the
nos supervisor kills a child to ensure that a suﬃcient number of restarts have
occurred for some sibling of the killed process.
It is interesting to note the way in which we formulate correctness prop-
erties using safety monitors. Instead of specifying them in a temporal logic,
what is done is to develop a set of simpliﬁed models of the system, and then
check whether the behaviour of the real component corresponds to these mod-
els. The use of the same language for regular development and for specifying
safety monitors eases the adoption of this technique by the developers.
4.2.2 Checking Liveness Properties
Some properties, i.e., liveness properties that express claims regarding eventual
behaviour, cannot be implemented as safety monitors. In this case, we can
instead formulate the property in LTL and use the automatic translator from
LTL formulae to Bu¨chi monitors. For example, in the case study an interesting
property to check is that always that a child terminates abnormally, it gets
eventually restarted. This property is expressed as:
always (P => eventually Q)
where P and Q are predicates stating that a child terminates abnormally and
a dead child gets restarted, respectively. Such predicates are speciﬁed in Er-
lang, and the correspondence between the names in the LTL formula and
the concrete implementation must be given to McErlang. As an example of
a predicate, this function implements the predicate that states that a child
terminates abnormally :
child_terminated(_, Actions , _) ->
lists:any
(fun (A) ->
try
died== mce_erl_actions:type(A),
normal =/= mce_erl_actions:get_died_reason(A)
catch _:_ -> false end
end , Actions ).
As can be seen, a predicate is a function which receives three arguments.
The ﬁrst is the program state, the second are the actions which triggered the
state change, and the third is some private state. If any action is an action
corresponding to a process dying (died action), with a Reason diﬀerent than
normal, this means that a child terminated abnormally.
Note, however, that this property holds only for a nos supervisor whose
children have restart intensity infinity; otherwise, after a suﬃcient number
of deaths, the child would not be restarted. To check more complex features,
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we need to keep a private state, and pass it along between the state predicates
(thus corresponding to a monitor state in the generated Bu¨chi automaton).
4.2.3 Modular Safety Monitors
Instead of trying to check all the desirable properties of the system using a
single complex safety monitor, it is advisable to deﬁne several safety monitors,
each checking a particular property of the system. This approach reduces the
risk of checking the system with incorrect safety monitors, as the resulting
monitors individually are much easier to understand and write. Moreover, a
large part of a safety monitor code is reusable when writing a new one. That
is, the strategy in which concrete actions are translated into abstract ones and
the way the monitor state is updated upon process deaths, spawn and kills,
is completely generic. What changes from one safety monitor (property) to
another is how the actions are interpreted – i.e., when the occurrence of an
action signal is interpreted as an error.
These are some of the safety monitors used in the veriﬁcation of the su-
pervisor component:
(i) A supervisor will always try to restart a child, until one reaches
the maximum restart intensity. Applicable for checking child speci-
ﬁcations with restart intensity diﬀerent than inﬁnity, and with kill sup
ﬁnally action.
(ii) When a child reaches its maximum restart intensity, living work-
ers are killed in reverse start order and then it terminates. Appli-
cable for child speciﬁcations with restart intensity diﬀerent than inﬁnity,
and with kill sup ﬁnally action.
(iii) When a child reaches its maximum restart intensity, living work-
ers are stopped in reverse start order. Applicable for child speciﬁ-
cation with restart intensity diﬀerent than inﬁnity with kill sup ﬁnally
action and infinity as shutdown strategy.
(iv) If a child has inﬁnity as shutdown strategy, the supervisor never
kills it.
(v) If a child has an integer as shutdown strategy, a supervisor never
kills a process before it has tried to stop it.
(vi) When the shutdown strategy for a child is stop child, when the
supervisor stops, the workers which were not respawned had
reached their maximum restart intensity.
(vii) For the all restart strategy, when a child dies, the supervisor
kills alive children in reverse starting order.
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(viii) For the all restart strategy, the workers are restarted in start
order after killing all alive children.
4.3 Veriﬁcation Scenarios
To verify the nos supervisor against the above correctness properties using
McErlang, a number of scenarios were designed manually, although it should
not be too diﬃcult to generate them automatically (e.g., using QuickCheck-
/Erlang [2]). To create this scenarios, a test worker nos test worker has
been implemented which only keeps track of its starting time. To simulate
process crashes, we enable an option in the McErlang model checker which,
non-deterministically, kills any process in any state. We select a subset of the
running processes for termination by executing:
mcerlang:process flag(do terminate, true)
in any process that is a candidate for termination (in the case study, the worker
processes). Thus, a worker processes can non-deterministically die at any
moment, which will cause the nos supervisor to be informed (and hopefully
take action).
As an example of a concrete scenario, to check the liveness property if a
child dies then eventually the nos supervisor will restart the child the simplest
adequate scenario would be a nos supervisor which spawns a child with restart
strategy child (the rest of options are not relevant).
{worker1 ,
{nos_test_worker ,start_link ,[worker1 ,foo]},
{nos_test_worker ,restart_link ,{worker1 ,foo}},
child , infinity , brutal_kill , []
}
We identiﬁed the relevant scenarios as a nos supervisor with, at least one
(two or three depending on the property) child processes. All the child pro-
cesses in a scenario have the same speciﬁcation for simplicity.
Each scenario was chosen to verify properties related to the behaviour of
the nos supervisor related to some of its options. For example, if we want
to verify that the nos supervisor evaluates a Finally action correctly when a
child reaches its maximum restart intensity, we only require a restart intensity
diﬀerent than infinity, but we must know if we should expect a exit(kill)
or a exit(shutdown) (which shutdown strategy is being applied).
4.4 The McErlang Debugger
What can be done if a property fails? McErlang provides a tool for explor-
ing counterexamples, manually exploring the state space, . . .: the McErlang
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debugger.
When running the model checker with safety monitor 2, McErlang returns
a counterexample, indicating that this property has failed:
*** Property violation detected at
minimum depth 13
*** Monitor failed
monitor error:
{failed_monitor
,"Processes not killed in reverse start order"}
Stack depth 13 entries;
state table contains 44446 states.
Access result using get(result)
To see the counterexample type
"mce_erl_debugger:start(get(result)). "
...
As can be seen, the length of the trace which leads to an error is shown,
as well as the concrete scenario of the failure. In the program trace given
by the debugger, we realized that the kill order was not the proposed in
the speciﬁcation. The debugger also allows us to manually explore the state
space to analyze other paths, and help us to locate the error (under which
circumstances does this error arise).
4.5 Experimental Results
The safety monitors previously described were checked on a set of scenar-
ios, constructed as described in Sect. 4.3. We present here some measures
taken in a Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad at 2.33GHz with 4GB of RAM mem-
ory. Figure 2 shows the number of states explored (Fig. 2a) by the model
checker and the time required (Fig. 2b) to check the safety monitor (i) given
in Sect. 4.2.3, for a scenario with restart strategy child, a restart inten-
sity of {1,1,kill sup}, and diﬀerent number of workers. The state space
may vary depending on scenario parameters (using the same number of work-
ers). For example, the number of states explored by the model checker using
{1,1,kill sup}, {2,1,kill sup} and {3,1,kill sup} were 6617, 13656 and
26712, respectively.
As expected with model checking techniques, the state space grows expo-
nentially making diﬃcult to check large scenarios using the actual implemen-
tation as a model. Nevertheless, even though nos supervisor behaviour has
been deployed in a number of LambdaStream products and no truly critical
errors were expected to be found, surprisingly, one discrepancy between the
speciﬁcation in the component documentation and the actual implementation
of the nos supervisor was found. McErlang returned a counterexample for
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Fig. 2. States explored and time required (restart strategy=child, restart inten-
sity={1,1,kill sup}).
the following combination of scenario and property If any children with spec-
iﬁcation kill sup and Finally reaches the maximum restart intensity, then
the supervisor only kills a child after all the “younger” children (those that
have been started after this child) are not running (stopped, killed, crashed,
dead, . . .) . The counterexample returned by McErlang was analyzed using
the McErlang debugger and it turned out that an “older” worker was killed
before a “younger” worker, i.e., they were not killed in reverse start order
as it was explicitly stated in the documentation. Although this discrepancy
does not seem relevant, it may cause a misbehaviour in some scenarios. For
example, if mutually dependent workers need to perform some actions before
stopping in a speciﬁed order.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the veriﬁcation of safety and liveness properties
using the McErlang tool on a process supervisor deployed as part of several
real-world products. Thanks to this veriﬁcation, we have improved the compo-
nent’s reliability, not only because a slight discrepancy between speciﬁcation
and implementation was identiﬁed but also because component speciﬁcation
became much more precise. From this veriﬁcation eﬀort we can conclude that
model checking is a valuable technique for analyzing concurrent programs, and
that McErlang can be succesfully applied to industrial software.
The methodology we have followed consists of three steps (a) creating a
model for the component, (b) expressing and implementing the properties of
interest, and (c) creating scenarios where the properties were checked. Creat-
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ing the model is a straightforward task as McErlang can use the source code as
a model with minimal changes. In the case study, the only required change was
to abstract from the timing aspects of the supervisor, into a non-deterministic
choice, as currently McErlang implements neither real-time nor discrete-time
model checking algorithms. Even though we have been able to verify most as-
pects of the supervisor without considering exact timing, an important aspect
for future work is to add support for real-time model checking algorithms to
McErlang.
The properties of interest were extracted from the component documen-
tation, and from informal discussion with the developers of the supervisor
component. Most of the properties were formulated as safety monitors, writ-
ten in Erlang, which observe the actions of the supervisor component as it
manages a set of children, and signaling an error if the supervisor issues an
incorrect command. In other words, we have deﬁned a set of simpliﬁed mod-
els, and check that the real supervisor has the same behaviour as the models
(up to the abstraction level of the monitor).
To ﬁght the inevitable state explosion problem of model checking we apply
the McErlang model checker not to a large monolithic scenario, but deﬁne and
check a large number of smaller scenarios (varying, for example, the number
of work processes). Even though the veriﬁcation is partial, as there is no way
we can check every possible scenario, we discovered a discrepancy between the
documentation and the actual implementation of the component in a small
scenario comprised of one supervisor and three children.
A signiﬁcant advantage of the approach to model checking taken in McEr-
lang, compared to other model checkers, is that there is no need for learning
a new speciﬁcation language since Erlang is both used as a programming lan-
guage and as a speciﬁcation language. This is achievable, in part, due to
the inherent power of a functional programming language which is suﬃciently
expressive to be used both for programming and for writing more abstract
speciﬁcations.
This technique can be used to check properties of larger systems, although
a set of small scenarios must always be chosen.
Still obviously there is much room for improvement. The learning curve to
be able to use McErlang eﬀectively, and to formulate correctness properties,
is currently too steep. In next release of McErlang improvements are planned
regarding the usability of the tool, to provide, for example, better information
on error causes, guidance in selecting appropriate veriﬁcation options, and a
simpliﬁed API for the formulation of correctness properties.
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